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Theoretical papers link the liquidity premium to the 
optimal trading decisions of investors facing transaction 
costs. In particular, investors’ holding periods determine 
how transaction costs are amortized and priced in asset 
returns. Using a unique data set containing two million 
trades, this paper investigates the relationship between 
holding periods and transaction costs for 66,000 
households from a large discount brokerage. The author 
finds that transaction costs are an important determinant 
of investors’ holding periods, after controlling for 
household and stock characteristics. The relationship 
between holding periods and transaction costs is stronger 
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among more sophisticated investors. Households with 
longer holding periods earn significantly higher returns 
after amortized transaction costs, and households that 
have holding periods that are positively related to 
transaction costs earn both higher gross and net returns. 
The author shows that there is correlation in the demand 
for liquid assets across households and, consistent with 
the notion of flight to liquidity, this demand increases 
during times of low market liquidity. Households with 
higher incomes and with higher wealth invested in the 
stock market supply liquidity when market liquidity is 
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Theoretical papers link the liquidity premium to the optimal trading decisions of 
investors  facing  transaction  costs.    In  particular,  investors‟  holding  periods 
determine how transaction costs are amortized and priced in asset returns.  Using 
a  unique  dataset  containing  two  million  trades,  this  paper  investigates  the 
relationship between holding periods and transaction costs for 66,000 households 
from a large discount brokerage.  I find that transaction costs are an important 
determinant of investors‟ holding periods,  after controlling for household and 
stock characteristics.  The relationship between holding periods and transaction 
costs is stronger among more sophisticated investors.  Households with longer 
holding  periods  earn  significantly  higher  returns  after  amortized  transaction 
costs, and  households that  have  holding  periods  that  are  positively  related  to 
transaction costs earn both higher gross and net returns. I show that there is 
correlation in the demand for liquid assets across households and, consistent with 
the notion of flight to liquidity, this demand increases during times of low market 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Theoretical papers link the liquidity premium to the optimal trading decisions of investors 
facing transaction costs.  An investor‟s required return on a stock subject to transaction 
costs will equal her required return in the absence of transaction costs plus these costs 
amortized over the investor‟s expected holding period.  In a seminal paper, Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) show that transaction costs cause a clientele effect, whereby investors 
with  longer  holding  periods  select  to  hold  stocks  with  higher  transaction  costs  in 
equilibrium.  These liquidity clienteles drive how transaction costs are  amortized and 
priced in asset returns.  In theoretical models where the holding period is determined 
endogenously, the frequency with which investors trade illiquid securities subject to high 
transaction costs determine the holding period over which these transaction costs are 
amortized.  If investors significantly reduce their trading of illiquid securities (Vayanos 
1998, Constantinides 1988, Heaton and Lucas 1996) then amortized transaction costs will 
be low and investors will demand only a small liquidity premium to hold illiquid assets.  
If, on the other hand, investors have frequent trading needs because of income shocks 
(Lynch and Tan 2007), exogenous liquidity shocks (Huang 2003), or because they need 
to hedge non-traded risk exposure (Lo, Mamaysky and Wang 2004), then the resulting 
liquidity premium can be quite large.  
Even  though  it  is  investors‟  trading  decisions  that  provide  the  link  between 
transaction costs and the liquidity premium on securities, lack of data on actual trades has 
made  it  difficult  to  empirically  examine  how  investors  behave  in  the  presence  of 
transaction costs.  Using a unique dataset, this paper investigates the liquidity decisions 
of 66,000 households that made over two million trades using a large discount brokerage 
over  a  six-year  time  period.    The  focus  of  this  paper  is  threefold.    First,  I  examine 
empirically the relationship between investors‟ holding periods and the transaction costs 
of securities they trade and hold in their portfolios.  Second, I investigate the impact of 
these liquidity decisions on investment performance.  Finally, I examine the systematic 
decisions of households as a group over time.  This paper differs from other empirical 
papers in this literature in that the focus is on investor (as opposed to stock) behavior. 
I  find  that  transaction  costs  play  an  important  role  in  households‟  trading  and 
investment decisions.  Transaction costs are an important determinant of holding periods   2 
of investors after controlling for various household and stock characteristics.  However, 
the effect of transaction costs on holding periods is much less than the effect predicted by 
the models of Vayanos (1998) and Constantinides (1988).  The results in this paper offer 
an explanation for the discrepancy between the empirically-observed liquidity premium 
and  the  one  predicted  by  these  models  in  which  the  holding  period  is  endogenously 
determined.
1  I find that households differ in how much attention they pay to the liquidity 
of the securities they trade  and hold.   More sophisticated  investors tend to pay more 
attention to liquidity  than less sophisticated investors.  In addition, more sophisticated 
investors have holding periods that are strongly correlated with measures of transaction 
costs, while less sophisticated investors have negative correlations.  
Household  liquidity  decisions   have  important  implications  for  investment 
performance.   I  find that households with longer  holding periods  earn  returns net of 
amortized transaction costs that are greater than the net returns of households with shorter 
holding periods.  These results are consistent with Amihud and Mendelson (1986),  who 
postulate  that investors with longer holding periods earn rents  that exceed amortized 
transaction costs for holding illiquid securities. This result drives the liquidity premium in 
their model.  Consistent with the notion that sophisticated investors pay closer attention 
to liquidity, I find that households whose holding periods are negatively correlated with 
transaction costs earn lower gross and net returns.  That is, households that do not pay 
attention to liquidity earn lower returns on both a gross and net basis.   
I also find that there is systematic variation in the demand for liquid assets across 
households.  Consistent with the notion of flight to liquidity, the demand for liquid assets 
goes up during times of low aggregate market liquidity, with households tending to buy 
liquid securities and sell illiquid securities.  However, a subset of investors with deep 
pockets,  i.e.,  those  with  higher  incomes  and  higher  levels  of  wealth,  buys  illiquid 
securities when there is a negative liquidity shock and, consequently, earns a premium in 
the process. 
While investor decision making in the presence of transaction costs is important to 
better understand how liquidity is priced in the financial markets, it also has implications 
                                                 
1 For empirical studies, see, for instance, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), 
Amihud (2002), and Amihud and Mendelson (1986).   3 
for investor welfare and public policy.  This paper shows that expected holding periods 
and amortized transaction costs strongly impact the performance of household portfolios.  
One implication is that investment advisors should consider the expected holding period 
of investors when recommending illiquid stocks to their clients. The results in this paper 
also have implications for the efficacy of a securities transaction tax.  Such a tax has been 
proposed to reduce excess speculation in order to reduce volatility and the influence of 
short-term investors on management (Stiglitz 1989, Tobin 1984, Summers and Summers 
1990). This paper provides an empirical link between the magnitude of such a tax and its 
impact on trading frequency of retail traders.   
This paper is also related to investor rationality and, in particular, to the increasingly 
popular notion that individual investors overtrade, losing substantial amounts to trading 
costs  without  any  gain  in  performance.
2  Usually  a  behavioral  bias ,  such  as 
overconfidence,  is  proposed  as  an  explanation  for  excessive  trading  by  individual 
investors who tend to ignore transaction costs .  Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005), for 
instance, show that investors pay attention only to the salient costs of mutual funds , but 
ignore hidden operating costs.  The findings in this paper suggest that most investors are, 
to a large extent, c ognizant of transaction costs when  making trading decisions. The 
findings suggest that, as investors trade more frequently, they pay greater attention to the 
liquidity of the underlying stocks traded.  A number of papers also document that a subset 
of retail investors displays greater financial sophistication and market understanding than 
the average retain investor, enabling them to  earn positive abnormal returns.
3  In this 
paper, I show that sophisticated households are more likely to hold illiquid stocks over a 
longer time period and earn greater net returns as a result. 
In a related paper, Atkins and Dyl (1997) study the relationship between turnover and 
bid-ask spreads for Nasdaq and NYSE stocks.  They find a positive relationship between 
bid-ask  spreads  and  holding  periods ,  which  they  proxy  with  turnover .    There  are, 
however, two problems with using aggregate turnover to proxy for holding periods.  First, 
aggregate turnover is an average across many investors and  can be highly skewed in a 
                                                 
2 Barber and Odean (2000) show that investors similarly ranked in terms of portfolio turnover have similar 
gross returns, but substantially different net returns after accounting for transaction costs.  Barber et al. 
(2008), using a complete transaction history of all investors in Taiwan, find that individual investor losses 
equal 2.2 % of GDP, and that such loses are mainly due to transaction costs. 
3 See the discussion in Section 2.   4 
market  where  a  handful  of  investors  trade  to  provide  liquidity.    Second,  and  more 
importantly, holding periods are based on trading decisions of investors who, ex-ante, 
consider the transaction costs of the underlying securities they trade.  In a concurrent 
paper,  Naes  and  Odegaard  (2008)  use  transaction-level  Norwegian  data  to  show  that 
turnover is indeed a poor proxy for actual holding periods of investors.  Their focus is on 
asset pricing, and they show that turnover is priced in size-sorted portfolios while average 
holding period is not.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes the 
empirical questions pursued in this paper.  Section 3 describes the liquidity measures and 
the individual trade data used herein.   Sections 4 to 6 present and discuss the main 
findings, and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  Hypotheses and Related Literature 
 
Although empirical studies document that the effects of transaction costs on asset prices 
are both statistically and economically significant, there is a debate in the  theoretical 
literature as to the direction and the magnitude of this relationship.
4  The debate centers 
on how investors make optimal trading decisions in the presence of transaction costs.  
The basic premise that the rate of return on a security should incorporate transaction costs 
is straightforward and uncontroversial.  An investor who buys a security and expects to 
pay transaction costs when selling it will take this into account in valuing th at security.  
An investor‟s required return on a stock will equal her required return in the absence of 
transaction costs plus these costs amortized over the investor‟s expected holding period.  
The  liquidity  premium  required  by  investors  to  hold  illiquid  securities  thus  depends 
strongly  on  investors‟  holding  periods.    The  theoretical  debate  over  the  effect  of 
transaction  costs  on  asset  prices  arises  primarily  from  differences  in  how  investors‟ 
holding periods are modeled. 
One of the earlier papers to incorporate investors‟ holding periods into asset pricing 
with market frictions is Amihud and Mendelson (1986).  They develop a model where 
                                                 
4 For empirical studies, see, for instance, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), 
Amihud (2002), Chordia et al. (2000, 2001), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Huberman and Halka 
(1999).   5 
risk neutral investors with different exogenous holding periods and limited capital trade 
securities  subject  to  fixed  transaction  costs.    Amihud  and  Mendelson  show  that 
transaction  costs  result  in  a  clientele  effect,  with  investors  who  have  longer  holding 
periods selecting to hold illiquid stocks in equilibrium.  Amortized transaction costs of 
investors  in  each  liquidity  clientele  group  determine  the  liquidity  premia  for  illiquid 
securities.     
The static model with exogenous holding periods has been extended to incorporate 
dynamic  decisions  of  investors.    In  models  where  the  holding  period  decision  is 
determined endogenously (Constantinides 1986, Vayanos 1998, Vayanos and Vila 1999, 
Heaton and Lucas 1996), the resulting liquidity premium is much lower.  In these models, 
the marginal utility from trading is low and investors respond to transaction costs by 
turning over their portfolio less frequently.  These models predict a liquidity premium on 
asset  prices  that  is  a  magnitude  smaller  than  transaction  costs,  but  they  also  predict 
unrealistically low levels of trading activity and volume.  In models where investors are 
forced to trade frequently (Huang 2003, Lynch and Tan 2007, Lo, Mamaysky and Wang 
2006) the resulting liquidity premium can be large. 
In all these models, the magnitude of the relationship between holding periods and 
transaction costs determines the liquidity premium in the market.
5  Using individual trade 
data, I  test for the  relationship between holding periods and transaction costs  after 
controlling  for  a  number  of  inv estor  and  stock  characteristics.  I  also  analyze  the 
magnitude of the impact of transaction costs on holding periods, and compare the results 
to calibrated values in the models of Vayanos (1998), Constantinides (1986) and Lo, 
Mamaysky and Wang (2005).  The first hypothesis is thus: 
     
H1a:  Holding periods are positively related to measures of fixed transaction costs after 
controlling for investor and stock characteristics. 
 
Previous studies have shown that, on average, households‟ stock investments perform 
poorly.  Odean (1999), for instance, reports that individual investors‟ purchases under-
                                                 
5 Although in this study I only focus on a subset of investors in the market, namely retail investors, a 
number of papers have shown that correlated trading by retail investors impact returns (Kumar and Lee 
2006, Barber, Odean and Zhu 2006, and Hvidkjaer 2008).   6 
perform their sales by a significant margin.
6  However, other studies have concluded that 
there exists a subset of  retail investors who display greater financial sophistication and 
market understanding than the average retail investor.  For instance, Coval, Hirshleifer, 
and Shumway (2005) document strong persistence in the performance of individual 
investors‟ trades, suggesting that some skillful individual investors might be able to earn 
positive abnormal profits. Using the same dataset as this paper, Goetzmann and Kumar 
(2008) find that the level of portfolio diversification is related to investor sophistication.  
Feng  and  Seasholes  (2005)  find  that  investor  sophistication  reduces  a  well  known 
behavioral bias, the disposition effect.  Given that previous studies have documented 
heterogeneity in the performance and investment decisions of individual investors, we 
should  expect  similar  cross-sectional  differences  in  the  correlation  between  holding 
periods and transaction costs across investors in the dataset.  Furthermore, we should 
expect this correlation to increase with investor sophistication and experience:   
 
H1b:  The  correlation  between  holding  periods  and  transactions  costs  is  higher  for 
sophisticated investors. 
  
The second empirical question I address in this paper is how holding periods and 
transaction costs impact investment performance.  In the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
model,  it  is  the  rents  earned  by  investors  with  longer  holding  periods  that  drive  the 
liquidity premium.  Security prices reflect the marginal investor‟s holding period, and 
have to fall by the present value of transaction costs to induce the marginal investor to 
buy the security.
7  The price for the security with the lowest transaction cost, for instance, 
is set such that th e  investor  with the  shortest holding period  is indifferent between 
investing in that security and the one with no transaction costs.   Investors with longer 
holding periods  earn  a  premium  (rent)  when investing in that security  because their 
amortized transaction costs are lower, which implies: 
  
                                                 
6 Barber and Odean (2000, 2001), using the same dataset as this paper, further show that investors lose 
substantial amounts to trading costs without any additional gain in performance, consistent with the 
hypothesis that individual investors are overconfident and tend to trade excessively.   
7 Vayanos and Vila (1997) show a similar result when securities are identical except for transaction costs.   7 
H2a:  Investors with longer holding periods earn returns net of amortized transaction 
costs that exceed net returns of investors with shorter holding periods. 
  
The  correlation  between  holding  periods  and  transaction  costs  is  likely  to  impact 
portfolio performance on both  a  gross  and  a net  basis.   Households  that do not  pay 
attention to transaction costs when they trade are likely to have lower net returns due to 
transaction  costs.    As  mentioned  earlier,  previous  studies  have  shown  investor 
sophistication to  be correlated with  higher portfolio  performance  and lower  levels  of 
behavioral biases.  A negative correlation between holding periods and transaction costs 
could, therefore,  also  indicate lack of financial  sophistication and market  knowledge, 
which is associated with lower gross returns.  Consequently: 
 
H2b:  Investors whose holding periods are negatively related to transaction costs earn 
lower gross and net returns.  
 
In other words, we would expect investors who do not pay attention to liquidity to make 
other trading mistakes, which result in lower gross returns.   
Previous  studies  have  shown  that  there  is  a  common  time  varying  component  to 
liquidity across stocks (Chordia et al 2000, Hasbrouck and Seppi 2001, and Huberman 
and Halka 2001).  Other studies have shown that this common component is priced in 
stock returns (Pastor and Stambaugh 2003, Acharya and Pedersen 2005, Korajczyk and 
Sadka 2008).  It is not clear, however, what causes this common variation.  Commonality 
in liquidity can arise from the supply side, if there is systematic variation in the costs of 
providing liquidity.
8  Commonality can also arise from the demand side , if a  common 
factor such as volatility or uncertainty cause s a systematic variation in the demand for 
liquidity.
9  Even with constant exog enous transaction costs, a time -varying liquidity 
premia can arise as investors‟ willingness to bear these costs changes over time.  Vayanos 
(2004), for instance, develops a model with fixed transaction costs in which changes in 
                                                 
8 Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000)  find some evidence of asymmetric information and inventory 
risk affecting the common component of liquidity.  Comerton-Forde et al (2008) and Coughenour and Saad 
(2004), examining liquidity of stocks at NYSE overseen by the same specialist, provide some support for 
the supply side view.  Huberman and Halka (2001), on the other hand, after failing to find inventory cost or 
asymmetric information based explanations for the systemic component of liquidity, conjecture that 
commonality emerges due to noise traders. 
9 Chordia et al. 2001 shows that trading activity covaries with liquidity.   8 
market volatility affect systematic liquidity by creating correlated trading patterns among 
investors.    By  examining  the  actual  trades  of  investors,  I  can  test  whether  there  is 
systematic variation in the demand for liquid assets and whether liquidity shocks apply 
(or transmitted) systematically across investors that can potentially cause market-wide 
effects: 
 
H3a:  There is systematic variation in households’ trades of illiquid stocks. 
 
If  there  is  systematic  variation  in  demand  for  liquid  assets  across  investors,  it  is 
important  to  examine  how  this  systematic  demand  varies  over  time  with  changes  in 
aggregate level of market liquidity.  If investors demand liquid securities at the same time 
when aggregate liquidity is low, the liquidity premium required to hold illiquid securities 
would be high. The literature, to a large extent, treats individual investors as noise traders 
who  provide  constant  liquidity  to  the  market.    Kaniel,  Saar,  and  Titman  (2006), 
Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2007), Stoffman (2008), and Griffin et al. (2003), 
investigating institutional and retail trades, provide evidence consistent with the notion 
that retail traders provide liquidity to meet institutional demand for immediacy.  These 
studies, however, investigate short-term returns to institutional and individual buy/sell 
imbalances, and do not consider the liquidity level of the market or the liquidity level of 
the individual securities that are traded.
10  With individual trade data, I can examine the 
liquidity level of the  securities bought and sold by individual investors, and  examine 
whether there is a flight to liquidity among households.  With individual trade data, I can 
also test if households are net demanders or suppliers of liquid securities when aggregate 
market liquidity is low: 
 
H3b:  Households are net buyers of illiquid stocks when the market level of liquidity is 
low. 
 
There are likely to be cross-sectional differences in trading patterns in response to 
aggregate liquidity shocks.  Investors with deep pockets can take advantage of investment 
opportunities during turbulent markets.  The recent Goldman Sachs‟ agreement to sell $5 
                                                 
10 In most of these studies, investors cannot be identified and their transactions cannot be tracked over time.    9 
billion of perpetual preferred stock to Berkshire Hathaway illustrates both the adverse 
effects that  market participants can create when seeking liquidity at the same time and 
the  important  role  that  external  investors  with  deep  pockets  can  play  in  providing 
liquidity.  We can expect households with higher wealth/income levels to buy illiquid 
assets that have dropped in price: 
 
H3c:  Households with higher income and wealth levels are net buyers of illiquid stocks 
when aggregate market liquidity is low.  
 
 
3.  Individual Trade Data and Liquidity Measures 
 
The main dataset for this paper comes from a major U.S. discount brokerage house and 
includes the daily trading records of 78,000 households from January 1991 to December 
1996.  These households hold a total of 158,034 accounts of various types including cash, 
margin, IRA and Keogh.  In this study, I focus on the common stock investments of the 
households, which constitute nearly two-thirds of the total value of their investments in 
the dataset.  About 66,000 of the 78,000 households trade common stock, making close to 
two million trades over the sample period. The transaction record includes number of 
shares  traded,  price  and  any  commissions  paid.    The  dataset  also  includes  each 
household‟s month-end positions including the value of security holdings at market close 
on the statement date.  For a sub-sample of households, the dataset includes demographic 
information, such as income, age, gender, occupation and marital status.  A more detailed 
explanation  of  the  dataset  can  be  found  in  Barber  and  Odean  (2000,  2001).    A 
comparison of this dataset with Survey of Consumer Finances, IRS and TAQ data has 
shown  it  to  be  representative  of  U.S.  individual  investors  (Ivkovic,  Sialm,  and 
Weisbenner 2006, Ivkovic, Poterba, and Weisbenner 2005, and Barber, Odean, and Zhu 
2006).   
Liquidity is a multi-faceted concept, and is usually defined in terms of the costs and 
risks associated with transacting financial securities.  These costs relate to exogenous 
costs of transacting including price impact, asymmetric information and inventory risk.  
Given the multi- faceted and unobservable nature of liquidity, I use a number of different   10 
measures that have been previously utilized in the literature.  The first is a  Bayesian 
version of the Roll (1984) transaction cost measure:  
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It is based on the model  , , , , i t i t i t i t r c q  where  , it q  is a trade direction indicator,  , it c  is 
the transaction cost measure and  , it is an error term for stock i at time t.    Equation (1) 
can be derived under the assumption that buyer- and seller-initiated trades are equally 
likely.    The  Bayesian  estimation  of  this  cost  measure  using  the  Gibbs  sampler  is 
described in detail in Hasbrouck (2006).
11   
The second measure is the Amihud illiquidity ratio, calculated as: 














  (2) 
 
where  , it D  is the number of days in month t for stock i,  , it dvol  is the dollar volume in day 
d, and  , id r is the daily return.  While the bid-ask spread captures the cost of executing a 
small trade, the Illiq variable is akin to Kyle‟s lambda and is meant to capture the price 
impact of a trade.  I adjust this measure as in Acharya and Pedersen (2005) to make it 
stationary and to remove outliers: 
 
  , , 1 min 0.25 0.30 ,30 i t i t t AdjIlliq Illiq M   (3) 
 
where  1 t M  is the ratio of the value-weighted market portfolio at the end of the month t-1 
to that of the market portfolio in July of 1962.  
The third measure used in this paper is the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) reversal 
gamma: 
                                                 
11 The Gibbs estimate is obtained from Joel Hasbrouck‟s website: 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jhasbrou/Research/GibbsEstimates2006/Liquidityestimates2006.htm.   11 
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i d t r  is the return in excess of the market return and 
,, i d t v  is the volume on day d 
in month t for stock i.  This measure is motivated by the Campbell, Grossman, and Wang 
(1993) model and is meant to capture temporary price fluctuations arising from order 
flow.   
I also include in the analyses quoted and effective spread and quoted depth calculated 
from intra-day data.  I use a 5-second delay to match trades with quotes and apply the 
same filters discussed in Hvidkjaer (2006).  The quoted percentage spread is calculated 
for each trade as the ratio of the quoted bid-ask spread to the prevailing transaction price.  
The effective percentage half-spread is calculated for each transaction as the absolute 
value of the difference between the transaction price and the quote midpoint, divided by 
the bid-ask midpoint. The quoted depth is the average of quoted bid-ask lots multiplied 
by bid-ask quotes.  In addition, I compute a realized spread, which is the ex-post realized 
bid-ask spread paid by the investors for each transaction in the dataset.  The calculation is 
the same as in Barber and Odean (2000): 
 
 










  (5) 
 
where  crsp P is the closing price from CRSP, and  sell P and  buy P are the purchase and sale 
prices from the dataset.  This measure includes the bid-ask spread, market impact of the 
trade as well as the intra-day return on the day of the trade.  The total spread is the sum of 
the realized buy and sell  spreads.  Previous studies (Korajczyk and Sadka 2008, and 
Eckbo and Norli 2002) have shown that there is high correlation among these liquidity 
measures and that there is a common component that accounts for most of the variation 
across individual liquidity measures.    12 
There is likely to be endogeneity in the relationship between holding periods and 
liquidity measures used in this paper.  As trading interest in a stock increases so does its 
liquidity.    But  we  can  also  think  of  a  stock  as  having  a  baseline  exogenous  cost 
component along the lines of Amihud and Mendelson (1986).  Although the liquidity 
level of a penny stock, for instance, will increase with increased trading interest, it will 
not  achieve  the  same  level  of  liquidity  of  a  large  cap  stock  purely  based  on  that 
increase.
12  Figure 1 illustrates this notion graphically.   I  plot the adjusted Amihud 
illiquidity ratio for IBM and  Crown Petroleum  Corp.  over the 1991 to 1996 period.  
Although there is variation over time in the liquidity levels  for both stocks, the average 
AdjIlliq  ratio  is  significantly  lower  for  IBM  over  the  sample  period.  To  capture  this 
baseline  component,  I  use  annual  averages  of  the  liquidity  measures  in  analyzing 
household holding periods. I later extend the analyses to incorporate time series variation 
in Section 6.  Table 1 reports the summary statistics and correlations for the liquidity 




4.  Holding Periods and Transaction Costs 
 
4.1. Transaction Level Analyses 
 
To  examine  the  relationship  between  holding  periods  and  transaction  costs,  I  first 
calculate a holding period for each transaction in  the dataset.  The holding period is 
defined as the number of trading days from the first purchase of a stock to the first sale.
13  
This method provides 806,404 holding period observations.  The average and the median 
holding period  are 185 and 86 trading days respectively.   Figure 2 shows the median 
holding periods for transactions grouped by investors‟ age, account type, the amount of 
capital they have invested in the stock market, as well as transactions grouped by the 
                                                 
12 In the analyses that follow, I also explicitly control for other potential determinants of holding periods 
such as stock and investor characteristics. 
13 This approach follows Seru, Shumway and Stoffman (2008).  I obtain similar results by defining the 
holding period as the time period until all positive positions are closed, as in Feng and Seasholes (2005).   13 
underlying stocks‟ liquidity.
14  The median holding period is  shorter for stocks held in 
retirement accounts.  Investors who are older and who have less wealth invested in the 
market have shorter holding periods.  There is also a strong relationship between holding 
periods and liquidity of stocks traded by the investors in the dataset. 
To explore this relationship further,  I rank and assign the 806,404 holding period 
observations to ten groups based on the length of the holding period.  For the stocks in 
each group, I then calculate averages for t he liquidity measures,  price,  and market 
capitalization.  The liquidity measures are calculated as of the purchase day, by averaging 
monthly or daily measures over the previous  12 months.   The results are reported in 
Table  2,  which  show  a  strong  relationship  between  holding  periods  and  liquidity 
measures.  The relationship is monotonic for most of the measures and is not a simple 
function of price or market capitalization.  The adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure, for 
instance, increases monotonically from 0.91 to 1.75.  There is a 54  basis points (bps) 
difference in the quoted spread and a 64 bps difference in the realized spread between the 
highest and the lowest holding period groups.   
Figure  3  shows  this  relationship  graphically.    I  plot  Kaplan -Meier  survival 
probabilities for stocks that are in the highest illiquidity decile using the adjusted Amihud 
illiquidity measure, and for all other stocks in the dataset.  The x-axis shows the number 
of days that have passed since the purchase of a stock, and the  two  lines plot  the 
probability of an investor holding a stock conditional upon no sale up to that point for the 
two groups of stocks.  Stocks ranked in the highest illiquidity decile have a significantly 
higher survival probability.  The initial univariate results suggest that holding periods are 
strongly related to measures of baseline transaction costs as predicted in hypothesis H1a.    
To  incorporate  stock  and  investor  characteristics,  I  utilize  a  hazard  model  in  the 
analysis  of  household  holding  periods.
15  With  hazard  models,  an   investor‟s  trade 
decision can be explicitly modeled by considering the investor‟s sell-hold decision each 
                                                 
14 In the figure, a stock is defined as Illiquid if it belongs to the lowest liquidity decile of stocks ranked 
according to the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio.  Other category includes all other stocks not in the 
lowest liquidity decile. 
15 The hazard framework has been previously used by Seru, Shumway and Stoffman (2008) and Feng and 
Seasholes (2005) in a similar context to model the disposition effect.   14 
day.  In this paper, I use a Cox proportional hazard model with potentially time varying 
explanatory variables.




0 exp t t x t z   (6) 
 
This is essentially a statistical model that describes how long an investor in the dataset 
will hold a stock before selling it.  The left hand side variable,  t , is the hazard rate,  
the probability of selling a stock at day t conditional upon holding that stock until that 
point in time.  The explanatory variables are called covariates and can either be static 
time varying.   In equation (6), x‟ represents time-varying covariates and z‟ represents 
covariates that are fixed over time.  0 t  is called the baseline hazard rate and describes 
the average hazard rate when the independent covariates are equal to zero.  Using the Cox 
(1972) estimator one can estimate coefficients on x and z (  and  ) without specifying a 
baseline  0 t  hazard rate.   
The static covariates used in this paper are investor and stock characteristics, which 
are explained in detail in the tables that follow.  The only time-varying covariate is a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of one for each day the stock price trades above its 
purchase  price.    This  dummy variable  measures  the  disposition  effect  -  a  behavioral 
tendency of  investors to sell shares whose price has increased while keeping shares  that 
have dropped in value.  Positions that are not closed by the end of the sample period are 
treated as censored observations.  As there is likely to be seasonality in purchases and 
sales,  calendar  month  dummies  are  also  included  as  static  variables  in  the  hazard 
regressions.
17  I follow standard reporting conventions and report hazard ratios instead of 
coefficients from the holding period regressions.  The hazard ratio is similar to the odds 
ratio in binary choice models.  It is defined as the ratio of two hazard functions when one 
of the explanatory variables is changed by one unit  holding everything else constant.  
Since the interpretation of a hazard ratio is more intuitive for dummy variables, I 
transform the explanatory variables into dummy intervals.   
                                                 
16 Details about estimating the proportional hazard model can be found in Cox and Oakes (1984).   
17 Open stock positions, for instance, may be closed out in December for tax reasons.     15 
Table 3 shows the results of the hazard regressions.  I report results using the adjusted 
Amihud illiquidity ratio as the transaction costs measure to save space.  Similar results 
are obtained using Pastor and Stambaugh‟s reversal gamma and the Gibbs estimate of 
Roll‟s transaction costs measure.  As explained before, the transaction costs measure is 
calculated by averaging the monthly Amihud illiquidity ratio over the 12 months prior to 
the purchase date.  I rank all stocks by the Amihud illiquidity ratio and create dummy 
variable  (AdjIlliq  Dum)  that  takes  on  a  value  of  one  if  stock  belongs  to  the  highest 
illiquidity quintile.  The hazard ratios corresponding to the dummy variables have  an 
intuitive interpretation.  They indicate the probability of a sale (conditional upon no sale 
up to that point) given that the underlying stock belongs to the highest illiquidity group 
divided by the probability of a sale given that the stock does not belong to that group.  A 
stock in the highest illiquidity group is 0.6 times as likely to be sold as a stock not 
belonging to that group.
18  In Model III, I control for investors characteristics and obtain 
a similar result.  As in the univariate analysis, I find that transaction costs are a significant 
determinant of holding periods of individual investors.  The average investor is cognizant 
of liquidity and pays attention to the transaction costs of the stocks she trades.  
The  results  I report are ro bust to  fixed household effects.  One way to capture 
heterogeneity across households within a hazard framework  is to assume a different 
baseline  hazard rate  for each  household ,  but  compute  common  coefficients  on  the 
explanatory variables.  The model is estimated by partial likelihood using the method of 
stratification.   Model  II in Table 3 shows that the effect of transaction costs variable 
increases once I control for fixed household effects.   The results suggest that there is 
variation in holding periods for different stocks for a given household, and that these 
holding periods are positively related to transaction costs. 
I find support for the hypothesis (H1b) that the correlation between holding periods 
and  transactions  costs  increases  with  investor  sophistication  and  experience. 
Characteristics  we  associate  with  investor  sophistication  are  correlated  with  shorter 
holding periods.  However, as evidenced by the hazard ratios on the interaction terms 
(Model IV in Table 3), those who are sophisticated tend to pay attention to the transaction 
                                                 
18 A stock in the lowest illiquidity group, on the other hand is 1.2 times more likely to be sold than a stock 
not belonging to that group.   16 
costs  of  the  stocks  they  trade.    Individuals,  who  are  professionals,  who  have  traded 
options or foreign securities or who have held short positions, have holding periods that 
are positively correlated with transaction costs.  Those who hold mutual funds, on the 
other hand, have holding periods that are negatively correlated with transaction costs.  
Individuals who are retired and individuals who trade stocks in their retirement account 
are  more  sensitive  to  transaction  costs.    In  addition,  households  who  have  more 
concentrated portfolios pay more attention to the liquidity of the underlying stocks they 
trade.   
To explore the role of investor sophistication further, I create a numeric variable to 
proxy for the level of investor sophistication. The Sophistication variable starts at a value 
of zero and is increased by one for each characteristic that one would associate with 
investor sophistication.  I follow Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) and assume that financial 
sophistication is correlated with education and resources available to an investor.  I also 
use information contained in investors‟ trades.  Table 4 describes the criteria used to 
construct the Sophistication variable. I run the same hazard regression as before (Model I 
in Table 3), but instead of pooling across all investors, I run a separate regression for each 
group of investors who have the same Sophistication value.  For instance, all investors 
with a Sophistication value equal to six would be one group.  Figure 4 plots the hazard 
ratios  on  the  AdjIlliq  Dum  variable  for  the  different  groups  of  investors  ranked  by 
Sophistication.    The  relationship  between  holding  periods  and  transaction  costs  is 
stronger for more sophisticated households.  The relationship is negative for households 
that  are  least  sophisticated,  and  there  is  a  monotonic  increase  in  the  strength  of  this 
relationship as we go from the lowest sophistication group to the highest.  In Table 4, I 
report  similar  result  pooling  all  investors  together.    I  create  a  dummy  variable 
(Sophistication > 3 Dum) that takes on a value of one if the Sophistication value for a 
given household in the dataset is greater than three.  An investor who is sophisticated is 
0.4 times as likely to sell an illiquid security at a given point in time, compared to an 
unsophisticated investor who is 0.6 times as likely to sell an illiquid security. 
 Although the differences in holding periods for stocks with different liquidity levels 
are significant, they are substantially lower than the calibrated values in Vayanos (1998) 
and Constantinides (1986).  Vayanos, for instance, predicts an increase in holding period   17 
of 6 years when transaction costs increase from 0.5% to 2%.  In comparison, a similar 
increase in transaction costs would increase the holding period of investors by about 190 
trading days in the dataset used in this paper.  The empirical results are closer to the 
calibrated values in Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2006) who predict a similar change in 
holding periods as in this paper.  The results in this section suggest that models that 
incorporate  potentially  exogenous  liquidity  or  trading  needs  are  more  likely  to  be 
representative of actual investor behavior.  The results also offer a potential explanation 
for  the  discrepancy  between  the  empirically  observed  liquidity  premium  and  the  one 
predicted by the models in which the holding periods are endogenously determined as in 
Vayanos (1998) and Constantinides (1986).         
 
4.2. Robustness Checks 
 
To make sure the results are robust to underlying stock characteristics, I include book-to-
market, size and momentum characteristics in the hazard regressions.  As before, to get a 
more intuitive interpretation of the results, each year I segment stocks into quintiles based 
on these stock characteristics.  Dummy variables are created and take on a value of one if 
a  stock  in  the  dataset  falls  into  one  of  the  five  groups.    These  characteristics  are 
calculated based on the information available at the beginning of the month in which a 
sale  is  made.    Table  5  summarizes  the  results  from  hazard  regressions  using  these 
characteristics.  The transaction costs measure remains significant after I control for stock 
characteristics, while the economic and statistical significance of stock characteristics is 
reduced once I control for liquidity.  On average, households tend to hold value and small 
stocks longer.  Relationship between momentum and holding period appears to be U-
shaped, but it is more significant at the high return end.  A stock belonging to the highest 
momentum quintile is 1.4 times more likely to be sold conditional on no sale up to that 
point in time.   
The  disposition  effect  (Shefrin  and  Statman  1985),  the  tendency  of  individual 
investors to hold on to losing stocks too long and to sell winners too quickly, has been 
shown to be a significant driver of trading behavior in a variety of contexts for both 
individual and institutional investors.  If the disposition effect is the main driver of a 
decision to buy/sell (Grinblatt and Kellaharjou 2001),  then the holding period and the   18 
liquidity of a stock would be determined to some extent by how much the stock‟s current 
price is above the investors‟ weighted average purchase price for that stock.  Given the 
robust  and  significant  relationship  that  has  been  established  in  the literature  between 
trading decisions and the disposition effect, and given its close relation to liquidity, I use 
the disposition effect as a control in the hazard regressions.  To do this, as mentioned 
earlier, I create a time-varying covariate to capture the disposition effect.  A dummy 
variable (Disp Dum) is set to one for each day a stock in an investor‟s portfolio trades 
above its purchase price.  I run the same hazard model as before, but now I include the 
disp variable as a time-varying covariate.  The results are provided in Table 5.  Using 
household level controls, I find that an individual is 1.8 times more likely to sell a stock 
when it is trading above its purchase price than when it is not.  The transaction costs 
variable is significant after controlling for the disposition effect, but is not able to explain 
away this effect.  It is also worth noting that the interaction term is positive, indicating 
that the disposition effect is stronger among less liquid stocks.  Households are more 
likely to sell an illiquid stock that is trading above the purchase price than one that is not 
illiquid. 
Existence of asymmetric information complicates the analysis.  It is not entirely clear 
how  aggregate  asymmetric  information  for  a  given  security  would  affect  its  average 
holding  period.    On  the  one  hand,  one  can  think  of  asymmetric  information  as  a 
component of transaction costs, which investors take into account  in  selecting which 
securities to hold.  On the other hand, if investors trade for both liquidity and information 
reasons, allocational inefficiencies could reduce the correlation between holding periods 
and  liquidity  (Garleanu  and  Pedersen  2007).    I  control  for  aggregate  asymmetric 
information in a given security by including the probability of information based trading 
(PIN)  measure  (Easley  et  al.  1997)  calculated  from  intra-day  data.
19  As before, I 
compute an annual PIN dummy variable for each stock in the dataset.  PIN Dum takes on 
a value of one if the stock is in the highest PIN group.  The results appear in Table 5 
under Model V.  The PIN measure significantly reduces the holding period of investors.  
                                                 
19 A detailed description is contained in Easley, Hvidkjaer and O‟Hara (2004).  The data is provided by 
Soeren Hvidkjaer at http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/hvidkjaer/pin1983-2001.zip.   19 
The  transaction  costs  measure,  however,  does  not  lose  its  economic  or  statistical 
significance.   
As  an  additional  control,  I  also  remove  potentially  informative  trades  from  the 
sample.   To control for information at the investor level, I run the same model as in the 
previous section, but remove from the sample trades that may have been conducted for 
informational reasons.  To identify trades that are not motivated by liquidity needs, I 
follow the same approach in Stoffman (2007).  If an individual investor sells his holdings 
of one security and then immediately uses the proceeds to buy another security, it is 
unlikely that the particular trade is motivated by liquidity needs.  I thus exclude trades 
that are one trading day apart and for which differences in the values of the trades are less 
than 5%.   Model I in Table 5 shows the results from the hazard regression with these 
trades removed from the sample.  The prior results become stronger when I exclude these 
potentially informative trades from the dataset.   
 
4.3. Portfolio Level Analyses 
 
I have thus far examined trading decisions of households at the transaction level.  I now 
consider liquidity decisions at the portfolio level.  As Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
argue, it makes sense for investors with longer holding periods to hold more illiquid 
stocks in their portfolio since those investors would face lower amortized transaction 
costs.    In  this  section,  I  analyze  the  determinants  of  overall  liquidity  of  household 
portfolios and examine how portfolio liquidity is related to households‟ average holding 
periods.   
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   20 
Above,  ,
k
it Eq  is the value of stock k in household i‟s portfolio at time t, and
, it
k AdjIlliq  is 
the adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure of stock k in month t. 
t MktIlliq is the market 
illiquidity, calculated as the equal weighted average AdjIlliq of all stocks in month t.  
Since average liquidity varies over time, 
t MktIlliq is used as an adjustment factor as in 
Amihud (2002).  I average the  , it PIlliq  over the sample period to compute an average 
portfolio illiquidity for each household.  Households hold mostly liquid stocks in their 
portfolio.  If we were to rank all stocks by the AdjIlliq measure, assign them to percentile 
ranks,  and  then  calculate  a  weighted  average  illiquidity  rank  for  the  stocks  in  an 
investor‟s portfolio, 50% of the households would have an average portfolio illiquidity 
rank  that  is  in  the  bottom  8
th  percentile  and  75%  of  the  households  would  have  an 
average portfolio illiquidity rank that is in the bottom 20
th percentile.  
I calculate a holding period for each household by averaging the holding period for 
the transactions made by that household.  In calculating the average holding periods, I 
treat positions that are not closed by the end of the sample period as censored.  The cross-
sectional average and median holding period across households are 437 and 348 trading 
days respectively.
20   Figure 5 shows the distribution of the  average holding periods of 
households calculated based on transactions that are closed  by the end of the sample 
period,  as well as  the  distribution of  holding periods calculated  taking into account 
transactions that are not closed and treated as censored.  
Table 6 shows the results  from regressing average portfolio liquidity on  household 
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In  equation  (8), i PIlliq  is  the average  portfolio  illiquidity of  household i.  i HP  is  the 
average holding period of household i, and  , ik InvCh  is the k
th demographic characteristic 
of household i described in detail in Table 6.  Holding period is a statistically significant 
                                                 
20 The average and median holding period considering only positions that are closed  (e.g. ignoring 
censored observations) are 217 and 168 trading days respectively.    21 
determinant of portfolio liquidity.  Given that the median and the 75
th percentile adjusted 
portfolio illiquidity, i PIlliq , across households is 0.037 and 0.105 respectively, what I 
report  is  also  an  economically  significant  relationship.    In  Model  II,  I  show  that 
households with higher amounts of wealth invested in the stock market hold more liquid 
stocks in their portfolio.  The same is true for individuals who are older and retired.  
Investors who hold less diversified portfolios hold more liquid stocks in their portfolios.   





5.  Holding Periods and Returns 
 
5.1. Amortized Transaction Costs and Returns 
 
In this section, I study the implications of liquidity decisions of individual investors on 
investment performance.  More specifically, I test hypothesis H2a outlined in Section 2.  
The liquidity premium in Amihud and Mendelson (1986) is driven by rents earned by 
investors who have longer investment horizons.  These investors can amortize transaction 
costs over a longer expected time period and therefore require a lower compensation for 
holding assets with higher transaction costs.  Illiquid assets are shunned by investors who 
have a shorter time horizon and heavily discounted by them.  As a result, long-term 
investors who bear these costs less frequently earn rents above and beyond the amortized 
costs of transacting these assets.      
I calculate a holding period for each transaction in the dataset that is closed-out by the 
end of the sample period.  I then calculate cumulative raw returns and returns in excess of 
size, book-to-market and momentum matched portfolios, as in Daniel et al. (1999), over 
the  holding  period  for  each  transaction.  Characteristics-adjusted  excess  returns  are 
calculated to make sure that the differences in returns are not driven by differences in 
stock characteristics.
21  To be able to make comparisons across different holding periods, 
I calculate average daily returns from cumulative raw and excess returns as: 
                                                 
21 In the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) model, investors are risk-neutral and in the absence of transaction 
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HP is the holding period measured in days, and  , id r is the daily raw or characteristics-
adjusted excess return for transaction i in day d.  I also compute 1, 6, and 12 month raw 
and excess returns starting from the day of purchase.  Transaction costs consist of round 
trip commissions divided by the value of purchases and sales, as well as the realized bid-
ask spread for purchases and sales, as described in Section 3.  Transaction costs are 
divided by the holding period to arrive at amortized transaction costs.  Consistent with 
Barber and Odean (2000), I find that on average, each transaction costs one percent in 
bid-ask spread and 1.4 percent in commissions.  In the analyses that follow, I exclude 
transactions with a holding period of less than two days and stocks priced below two 
dollars.   
I rank all transactions by the holding period and place them into five groups.  I then 
average returns for the transactions in each group.  The results are reported in Table 7.
22  
In the lowest holding period group, stocks are held on average for 10 days and earn 34.21 
basis points (bps) per day before transaction costs.  In contrast, stocks in the  highest 
holding period group are held on average for 543 days and earn 2.31 bps per day before 
transaction costs.  Average characteristics-adjusted excess returns are 20.65 bps and -3.59 
bps per day before transaction costs, respectively, for the two groups.   Thus, short-term 
traders earn greater daily returns before transaction costs than long -term traders.  Short 
term traders also earn greater 1, 6 and 12 month returns before transaction costs.  Once I 
control for transaction costs, however, the picture changes.  For the lowest holding period 
group, the average return minus amortized commissions and bid -ask spreads is 0.39 bps 
per day, compared with a net return of  1.14 bps per day for the highest holding period 
group.  Moreover, characteristics-adjusted excess returns are negative for all groups after 
controlling for transaction costs, but significantly more so for  the low holding period 
group.  The difference in returns between the lowest and highest holding period groups is 
significant.  These results are consistent with hypothesis H2a outlined in Section 2, in the 
                                                 
22 Results are reported at the transaction level.  I obtain similar results if I aggregate to the household level.   23 
sense that the returns, net of transaction costs, for households with longer holding periods 
are higher than for households who have shorter holding periods.  The relationship for 
raw returns, however, is not monotonic.   
Since  I  am  examining  transaction  returns  as  opposed  to  returns  for  the  whole 
portfolio, the results could be biased if only profitable trades are closed out producing a 
disposition effect.  In other words, there might be an upward bias for short-term trades, 
since they may consist mostly of positions that are closed out because the prevailing price 
is above the purchase price.   I consider returns for fixed holding periods from the day of 
purchase (1, 6, 12 month returns are also reported in Table 7).  However, this gets us 
away from the notion of holding period returns.  As a result, I also remove from the 
sample those households with a strong tendency to close out positions that trade above 
the purchase price.  To identify these households, I split the dataset into two equal time 
periods and use the first period (from 1991 to 1993) to calculate coefficients on the disp 
variable explained in Section 4.  I eliminate households with a positive disp coefficient 
calculated with a 10% confidence level or higher.  To make sure that I do not introduce a 
new bias I also eliminate households with a significant negative disp coefficient.  I use 
the  second  time  period  (from  1994  to  1996)  to  calculate  holding  period  returns  and 
amortized transaction costs as described earlier.  The results are in Panel B of Table 6.  
Holding period raw and characteristics-adjusted excess returns are now more uniform.  
Differences  in  raw  returns  between  the  high  and  low  holding  period  groups  are  not 
significant. There is now a monotonic relationship in returns net of amortized transaction 
costs across holding period groups, consistent with hypothesis H2a.   
 
5.2. Liquidity Decisions and Returns 
 
There  are  cross-sectional  differences  in  the  correlation  between  holding  periods  and 
transaction costs  across households.   As described in  Section 2, this  correlation  may 
impact portfolio performance of households on a gross and a net basis.  First, households 
that do not pay attention to transaction costs would be expected to pay higher transaction 
costs,  generating  lower  net  returns.    Second,  a  negative  correlation  between  holding 
periods and transactions costs could also indicate low levels of sophistication and market 
knowledge, resulting in lower gross returns.  To identify the two types of households, I   24 
use the same hazard model as before, but now instead of pooling across all households, I 
estimate the coefficient on the transaction costs variable for each household separately. I 
then use the correlation between holding periods and transaction costs as a proxy for how 
much  each  investor  pays  attention  to  transaction  costs.  In  order  to  obtain  robust 
estimates, I require that households make at least 50 round-trip trades over the sample 
period, and  I only keep estimates that are calculated with a 10% confidence level or 
higher.
23  The summary statistics for the transaction costs  coefficient calculated from 
household  level  hazard  regressions  are  reported  in  Table  8 .    For  the  majority  of 
households in  the  dataset  (over  60%), the correlation between holdin g periods and 
transaction costs is positive.  Most investors pay attention to the liquidity level of stocks 
they trade.   
The  relationship  between  holding  periods  and  transaction  costs  has  strong 
implications for investment performance.  I form two groups based on the sign of the 
coefficient on the transaction costs variable, and calculate 1, 6 and 12 month and holding 
period returns for each transaction as described in the previous section.  I then calculate 
averages for the two groups.  The results are in Table 9.  There is a stark difference in the 
investment  performance between the two groups.  Households  that  pay attention to 
transaction costs earn about 20 .5 bps in gross returns and 10.7 bps in  characteristics-
adjusted excess returns each day, compared to 0.1 bps in gross returns and -6.6 bps in 
excess returns  each day  for households  that do not.  Households  that pay attention to 
transaction costs pay less in  amortized  spreads and have higher net  returns  and  net 
characteristics-adjusted  excess  returns.    They  ea rn  7.1  bps  per  day  in  net  returns, 
compared  to  a loss of  -10.9  bps  per  day for households whose holding periods are 
negatively related to  transaction costs.  The differences in returns are all statistically 
significant except for the one month returns.   Since the differences are  significant for 
both  gross  and  net  returns ,  the  positive  relationship  between  holding  periods  and 
transaction costs is consistent with the hypothesis (H2b) that investors who pay attention 
to liquidity earn greater gross and net returns.   
 
 
                                                 
23 I obtain similar results using 20 or 30 trades instead of 50 trades.     25 
6.  Individual Investors and Demand for Liquid Securities 
 
6.1 Common Demand for Liquid Securities 
 
In  this  section,  I  extend  the  analysis  to  consider  how  households  as  a  group  make 
liquidity decisions over time.  As described in Section 2, commonality in liquidity can 
arise from investors demanding liquidity at the same time.  Increase in uncertainty about 
changes  in  future  income  or  wealth,  for  instance,  can  cause  investors  to  tilt  their 
portfolios  towards  more  liquid  assets  at  the  same  time.    To  test  whether  there  is 
systematic variation in the trades of liquid assets, I employ a similar methodology used in 
Kumar and Lee (2006) and Barber, Odean and Zhu (2003), who investigate correlation in 
the trades of individual investors. Since I make comparisons over time under different 
regimes  of  aggregate  liquidity,  I  consider  stock  liquidity  rankings  instead  of  stock 
liquidity levels.  Each month, I rank stocks based on the adjusted Amihud illiquidity 
measure and assign them to percentile ranks.  A stock ranked in the 100
th percentile 
would be the most illiquid stock in a given month.  Similarly, a stock ranked in the 1
st 
percentile would be the most liquid.   
For groups of non-overlapping investors, G, I compute a time series of normalized 
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t BV and 
i
t SV are the total value of purchases and sales, respectively, for investor i 
in month t.  1
i
t BAdjIlliqRank and  1
i
t SAdjIlliqRank are the weighted average adjusted 
illiquidity rank of stock holdings of investor i belonging to group G in month using one 
month  lagged  adjusted  illiquidity  ranks. 
G
t IlliqBSI is  similar  to  a  buy-sell  imbalance 
index and indicates whether investors belonging to group G are net buyers or sellers of 
liquid securities in a given month.
 24   If the trades of liquid securities are independent 
                                                 
24 There are number of different ways to formulate this analysis.  Another approach would be to examine 
how investors over time tilt their portfolios towards stocks in the top/bottom illiquidity deciles.  Kumar   26 
across households, then purchases and sales of liquid stocks by one group of investors 
will be uncorrelated with that of another group.  To test for this independence, I form 
5,000  pairs  of  non-overlapping  investor  groups  containing  500,  1,000  and  5,000 
investors.  For each 
G
t IlliqBSI , I then remove the effects of common dependence due to 
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In the equation above,  t MKT is the month t market return in excess of the risk free rate, 
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t Buy V and ,
i
t Sell V are the total value of purchases and sales, respectively, of investor i in 
month t.  I aggregate over all N investors.  The reason for this regression is to remove the 
common component in the households‟ net demand for liquid securities due to market 
movements  and  changes  in  overall  household  demand  unrelated  to  liquidity.    I  then 
compute correlations of the residuals, 
G
t , for different pairs of investor groups.   
The results are reported in Table 10.  The correlation values range from 18% to 32% 
depending on the number of investors  used in the simulation .   All  correlations are 
statistically different from zero.  These results s uggest the existence of a  systematic 
component in the demand for liquid  securities across households.  The results support 
hypothesis  H3a,  that  there  is  systematic  variation  in  households‟  trades  of  illiquid 
securities.   
 
6.2 Aggregate Market Liquidity and Household Demand for Liquid Securities 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2009) uses this methodology to investigate dynamic style preferences of individual investors.  I obtain 
similar results examining shifts in portfolio positions as in Kumar (2009).      27 
 
As mentioned in Section 2, a number of papers treat retail investors as noise traders 
providing constant liquidity to the market.  However, if there is systematic variation in 
the demand for liquid assets by individual investors, as I have shown in the previous 
section, then their role as liquidity providers to the rest of the market is not clear.  In fact, 
changes  in  aggregate  liquidity  can  arise  endogenously  from  correlated  trading  by 
individual investors.  In this section I investigate how this systematic demand for liquid 
securities varies with changes in aggregate market liquidity.  I test whether there is a 
flight to liquidity, and examine if a subset of individual investors provide liquidity to the 
market by buying illiquid securities during times of low market liquidity.   
I calculate monthly market liquidity as the equal-weighted average of the adjusted 
Amihud illiquidity ratio for all stocks in a given month (as in Amihud 2002 and Acharya 
and Pedersen 2005).
25  As before, since I make comparisons over time under different 
regimes of aggregate liquidity, I consider the liquidity rankings of stocks instead of their 
liquidity levels.  For all households, I compute difference in the liquidity ranks of stocks 
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  (13) 
 
The variables are defines as in equation (10), but now we compute the sum over all N s.  
Figure 6 plots 
ALL IlliqBSI  and the aggregate market level of illiquidity, MktIlliq, over the 
sample period.  In the figure, the period with low market liquidity corresponds with the 
Mexican peso crises in 1994.  The correlation between 
ALL IlliqBSI  and MktIlliq is -35%.  
Individual  investors  tend  to  buy  liquid  stocks  and  sell  illiquid  stocks  when  market 
liquidity is low.   
I split the data into five equal time periods ranked by the aggregate level of market 
illiquidity.  The first time period corresponds to the 34 months with the lowest level of 
market illiquidity, and the last period to 34 months with the highest level.  Table 11 
                                                 
25 I obtain qualitatively similar results if I use the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure.  The 
correlation between the measure used in this paper and the Pastor and Stambaugh measure is 30%.   28 
reports the differences in the illiquidity ranks of stocks bought and sold during these five 
time periods, and also during the month corresponding to the highest level of market 
illiquidity.  When market illiquidity is at its highest point during the 1991 to 1994 period, 
the difference in the illiquidity rank of the stocks purchased and sold by households is 
1.1.  When one considers the fact that 50% of the households have an average portfolio 
illiquidity  rank  that  is  in  the  bottom  8
th  percentile,  the  differences  I  report  are  both 
economically  and  statistically  significant.    The  last  column  shows  the  differences  in 
illiquidity ranks of stock purchases and sales adjusted for household portfolio level of 
liquidity.  For this adjustment, I subtract the weighted average illiquidity rank of each 
household‟s portfolio from the illiquidity rank of stocks transacted by that household.  
The magnitude of the differences is lower but still significant and consistent with the 
earlier  result  that  investors  tend  to  purchase  more  liquid  securities  when  aggregate 
liquidity is low.   
Table 12 shows the results from regressing illiquidity ranks of stocks purchased or 
sold in a given month on market illiquidity and investor wealth and income.  I estimate 
the following regression:  
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In  equation  (14),  , kt TransAdjIlliqrank   is  the  lagged  adjusted  illiquidity  rank  of  the 
underlying stock for transaction k in month t.
 26 To get a more intuitive interpretation of 
the regression results, I transform the market illiquidity variable into a dummy variable (
t MktIlliqDum ) that takes on a value of one for the month in which market illiquidity is at 
its highest during the sample period.   , kt Buy  is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 
one if the transaction k in month t is a purchase, and  i Affluent  is a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of one if investor i is in the highest income bracket (>$100,000) and has 
                                                 
26 In the regressions, I use lagged (previous month‟s) illiquidity ranks for stocks transacted in a given 
month.  I obtain similar results using contemporaneous illiquidity ranks.      29 
invested more than $100,000 in the stock market during the sample period.
27  Model I in 
Table 11 shows that on average, when market illiquidity is high, households trade more 
liquid stocks.  The coefficient on the interaction term,    MktIlliq Dum Buy , in Model II 
is negative.  Since I am using dummy variables, the coefficient on the interaction term 
shows how much the illiquidity rank of the stocks purchased are higher or lower than 
stocks sold during times of low market liquidity.  The -1.6 coefficient on the interaction 
term is economically and statistically significant.  Controlling for fixed household effects 
in Model III slightly reduces the effect to -1.0. 
In hypothesis H3c, I predict that households with higher levels of wealth and income 
buy illiquid assets that have dropped in price providing liquidity to the market.  The 
interaction term,   MktIlliq Dum Buy Affluent , in Model IV in Table 12 is positive.  
Households with higher incomes and higher amounts invested in the stock market tend to 
buy  more  illiquid  stocks  during  times  of  low  market  liquidity.   The  net  effect of  an 
increase  in  illiquidity  rank  of  purchases by  Affluent households during  times of high 
market illiquidity is 0.93.  As before, this result is both economically and statistically 
significant.    The  results  are  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  investors  with  deep 
pockets  provide  liquidity  to  the  market  by  purchasing  illiquid  stocks  when  market 
liquidity is low. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
This  paper  investigates  both  portfolio  and  stock  level  liquidity  decisions  of  66,000 
households  from  a  large  discount  brokerage.  It  provides  an  empirical  link  between 
investor  decisions  and  the  liquidity  premium  observed  in  the  market.    Three  main 
conclusions  follow  from  the  analysis.    First,  transaction  costs  are  an  important 
determinant of investment policies and trading decisions.  Consistent with theoretical 
models of investor behavior, households rationally reduce the frequency with which they 
trade illiquid securities subject to high transaction costs.  This finding is robust to various 
controls, including household and stock characteristics as well as the disposition effect 
and the level of asymmetric information.  The results also hold at the portfolio level. 
                                                 
27 I obtain similar results if I use a $75,000 or $150,000 cut-off for income and wealth invested in the stock 
market.    30 
Consistent  with  the  notion  of  liquidity  clienteles,  investors  with  longer  investment 
horizons tend to hold more illiquid securities.  There is cross-sectional variation in the 
relationship between holding periods and transaction costs across households, and I find 
that this relationship is stronger among more sophisticated investors.  Second, I show that 
liquidity  decisions  have  important  implications  for  investment  performance.    As 
postulated by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), households with longer holding periods 
earn  significantly  higher  returns  after  amortized  transaction  costs.    In  addition, 
households that have holding periods that are negatively related to transaction costs earn, 
on average, lower gross and net returns.  Finally, this paper shows that there is systematic 
variation in demand for liquid assets across investors.  Consistent with the notion of flight 
to  liquidity,  households  are  net  demanders  of  liquid  securities  during  times  of  low 
aggregate market liquidity.  Households with higher incomes and higher wealth invested 
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Table 1: Liquidity Measures Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics and correlations for the liquidity measures used in this paper.  Only 
stocks that are traded by households in the dataset are considered.  Summary statistics and correlations are 
calculated by pooling annual observations over the 1991-1996 time period.  All liquidity measures are 
annual averages and are defined in the text.  Price is the average of the daily closing prices.  Mkt Cap is the 
average market capitalization.  PS Gamma is Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) reversal gamma.  AdjIlliq is the 
adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio.  Rolls C is the Bayesian estimate of the Roll (1984) transaction cost 
measure.  The quoted spread is the ratio of the quoted bid-ask spread to the prevailing transaction price.  
The effective spread is the absolute value of the difference between the transaction price and the quote 
midpoint,  divided  by  the  bid-ask  midpoint.  The  quoted  depth  is  the  average  of  quoted  bid-ask  lots 
multiplied by bid-ask quotes.  Realized spread is the realized bid-ask spread paid by the investors for each 














Mean  26.81  1.73  18.61  1,045  7.23  324.32  205.53  685.72 
Median  0.49  1.06  12.50  105  1.66  162.13  95.54  385.06 
Std  316.79  2.05  124.04  4,549  9.70  532.61  385.57  898.28 
P25  -0.34  0.45  5.00  30  0.38  100.54  54.56  161.69 
P75  9.18  2.26  24.50  452  11.64  301.51  186.85  845.93 
Pearson Correlations 
PS Gamma  1.00               
Rolls C   0.15  1.00             
Price  -0.01  -0.07  1.00           
Mkt Cap  -0.02  -0.15  0.09  1.00         
AdjIlliq  0.16  0.76  -0.07  -0.16  1.00       
Quoted Spread  0.17  0.58  -0.30  -0.13  0.54  1.00     
Effective Spread  0.18  0.60  -0.29  -0.12  0.53  0.94  1.00   
Quoted Depth  -0.04  -0.24  0.40  0.61  -0.28  -0.27  -0.25  1.00 
Spearman Correlations 
PS Gamma  1.00               
Rolls C   0.41  1.00             
Price  -0.34  -0.81  1.00           
Mkt Cap  -0.38  -0.83  0.85  1.00         
AdjIlliq  0.39  0.85  -0.76  -0.91  1.00       
Quoted Spread  0.15  0.71  -0.80  -0.76  0.75  1.00     
Effective Spread  0.16  0.72  -0.81  -0.79  0.78  0.97  1.00   
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Table 2: Univariate Results 
 
This table presents the univariate results.  Transactions in the dataset are ranked by holding-periods and 
placed into ten groups.  Averages for the various liquidity measures for the underlying securities are then 
calculated for each group.  All liquidity measures are annual averages and are defined in the text.  Price is 
the average of the daily closing prices.  Mkt Cap is the average market capitalization.  PS Gamma is Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2003) reversal gamma.  AdjIlliq is the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio.  Rolls C is the 
Bayesian estimate of the Roll (1984) transaction cost measure.  The quoted spread is the ratio of the quoted 
bid-ask  spread  to  the  prevailing  transaction  price.    The  effective  spread  is  the  absolute  value  of  the 
difference between the transaction price and the quote midpoint, divided by the bid-ask midpoint. The 
quoted depth is the average of quoted bid-ask lots multiplied by bid-ask quotes.  Realized spread is the 
realized bid-ask spread paid by the investors for each transaction in the dataset.  Spreads are given basis 









































Low  6  32.89  7,940  1.2743  0.9142  0.6608  118.84  83.61  3,140  62.99 
2  20  32.04  7,602  1.7055  0.9943  0.6834  124.19  86.96  3,027  78.27 
3  44  31.28  7,833  2.2359  1.0893  0.7054  123.82  86.83  3,058  104.96 
4  79  31.52  9,029  2.3783  1.1265  0.7072  119.13  83.38  3,185  112.82 
5  127  33.96  9,199  2.7837  1.2606  0.7337  119.24  84.20  3,266  132.60 
6  194  31.21  10,513  3.1087  1.2421  0.7312  117.93  83.26  3,415  130.82 
7  294  30.36  9,886  3.9784  1.3535  0.7382  115.72  81.57  3,341  139.63 
8  470  29.47  10,266  3.6685  1.3819  0.7312  113.94  80.57  3,519  136.90 
9  771  31.74  11,434  4.4004  1.4889  0.7425  115.51  81.71  3,748  129.28 
High  1225  40.76  11,270  6.4303  1.7578  0.8182  172.55  121.30  2,977  127.18 
High – Low  1219***  7.87***  3330***  5.156***  0.8436***  0.1575***  53.71***  37.69***  -162***  64.19***   37 
Table 3: Hazard Regressions 
 
This table reports hazard ratios from the holding period regressions where the conditional probability of 
sale is the dependent variable.  Independent variables consist of a transactions costs measure and a set of 
investor demographic and trade variables.  AdjIlliq Dum is a dummy variable that takes on a value equal to 
one if a stock in the dataset is in the highest quintile ranked by the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio 
calculated over the previous 12 months prior to a transaction.  Age [40-64] Dum is a dummy variable set 
equal to one if the age of the head of the household is between 40 and 64.  Age 65+ Dum is a dummy 
variable set equal to one if the age of the head of the household is over 64.  Income > 75K Dum is a dummy 
that is set to one if the total annual household income exceeds $75K.  Married Dum is a dummy variable set 
to one if the head of the household is married.  Male Dum is set to one if the head of the household is male.  
Professional Dum and Retired Dum are dummy variables that reflect investors‟ occupation. Professional 
Dum is set to one for investors who hold technical and managerial positions and Retired Dum is set to one 
for  investors  who  are  retired.  Retirement  Account  Dum  is  set  to  one  if  the  underlying  account  is  a 
retirement (IRA or Keogh) account.  Trade variables are derived from the trades made by investors in the 
dataset.  Short User Dum is set to one if an investor executed at least one short-sell during the sample 
period.  Option User Dum is set to one if an investor has traded in options.  Mutual Fund user Dum is set to 
one if an investor has held mutual funds during the sample period.  Foreign User Dum is set to one if an 
investor made at least one trade in a foreign asset including ADRs, foreign stocks or foreign mutual funds 
during the sample period.  Total Equity > 45K is dummy variable set to one if household‟s total value of 
equity invested in the stock market exceeds $45K.  Diversification is defined as in Goetzmann and Kumar 
(2008), and is equal to the sum of the squared value weight of each stock in a household‟s portfolio.  
Diversification < 0.3 Dum is dummy variable if this diversification measure for a given household is less 
than 0.3.  Calendar month dummies (not reported) are twelve dummy variables that take on a value of one 
if the month of the transaction is equal to the month dummy.  Robust standard errors are calculated as in 
Lin and Wei (1989).  Ties are handled using the Efron procedure. Wald test is for each additional set of 
regressors. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
   Model I     Model II     Model III     Model IV 
   Haz Ratio  p-val     Haz Ratio  p-val     Haz Ratio  p-val     Haz Ratio  p-val 
AdjIlliq Dum  0.617***  <.0001     0.602***  <.0001     0.632***  <.0001     0.804**  0.0470 
Demographic Variables 
Age [40 - 64] Dum                    0.988  0.1698    0.986  0.1168 
Age 65 + Dum                    0.83***  <.0001    0.829***  <.0001 
Income > 75K Dum                    0.921***  <.0001    0.921***  <.0001 
Married Dum                    0.945***  <.0001    0.945***  <.0001 
Male Dum                    1.101***  <.0001    1.101***  <.0001 
Professional Dum                    1.009  0.3158    1.01  0.2319 
Retirement Acct Dum                    0.852***  <.0001    0.852***  <.0001 
Retired Dum                    1.091***  <.0001    1.093***  <.0001 
Trade Variables 
Foreign securities Dum                    1.146***  <.0001    1.147***  <.0001 
Mutual fund user Dum                    0.988**  0.0701    0.985**  0.0232 
Option user Dum                    1.492***  <.0001    1.497***  <.0001 
Short user Dum                    1.968***  <.0001    1.976***  <.0001 
Total Equity > 45K Dum                     1.314***   <.0001    1.318***  <.0001 
Diversification < 0.3 Dum                    0.705***  <.0001       
Interactions 
AdjIlliq Dum * Age [40 - 64] Dum                          1.151*  0.0832 
AdjIlliq Dum * Age 65+ Dum                             1.189  0.1286 
AdjIlliq Dum * Income > 75K Dum                          0.933***  <.0001 
AdjIlliq Dum * Married Dum                             1.019  0.7706 
AdjIlliq Dum * Male Dum                             0.975  0.8240   38 
AdjIlliq Dum * Professional Dum                          0.863**  0.0364 
AdjIlliq Dum * Retirement Acct Dum                          0.959*  0.0521 
AdjIlliq Dum * Retired Dum                             0.858**  0.0129 
AdjIlliq Dum * Foreign Dum                             0.919**  0.0179 
AdjIlliq Dum * Mutual fund Dum                          1.274***  <.0001 
AdjIlliq Dum * Option user Dum                          0.794***  0.0013 
AdjIlliq Dum * Short user Dum                            0.781***  <.0001 
AdjIlliq Dum * Total Equity                             0.854**  0.5464 
AdjIlliq Dum * Diversification < 0.3 Dum                          1.197***  0.0032 
Household effects     No        Yes        No        No 
Calendar month dummies     Yes        Yes        Yes        Yes 
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Table 4: Household Sophistication Measure 
 
The top panel lists the criteria used to construct the Sophistication variable. This variable is increased by a 
value of one if an investor in the dataset meets anyone of the criteria listed n the table. The bottom panel 
reports hazard ratios from the holding period regression, where the conditional probability of sale is the 
dependent variable.  AdjIlliq Dum is a dummy variable that takes on a value equal to one if a stock in the 
dataset  is  in  the  highest  quintile  ranked  by  the  adjusted  Amihud  illiquidity  ratio  calculated  over  the 
previous 12 months prior to a transaction.  Sophistication > 3 Dum is dummy variable set to one if the 
Sophistication variable for an investor in the dataset is greater than three.  Calendar month dummies (not 
reported) are twelve dummy variables that take on a value of one if the month of the transaction is equal to 
the month dummy.  Robust standard errors are calculated as in Lin and Wei (1989).  Ties are handled using 
the Efron procedure. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 
Criteria  Sophistication 
Income > $75K   + 1 
Equity Investments > $45K   + 1 
Investor is a professional   + 1 
Trades Options   + 1 
Trades Foreign Securities   + 1 
Does not invest in Mutual Funds   + 1 
Has held a Short position   + 1 
Portfolio  Diversification < 0.3   + 1 
        
   Haz Ratio  p-val 
AdjIlliq Dum  0.625***  <.0001 
Sophistication > 3 Dum  1.110***  <.0001 
Sophistication > 3 * AdjIlliq Dum  0.714***  <.0001 
Calendar Month Dummies   Yes 
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Table 5: Robustness Checks 
 
This table reports the result of hazard regressions where the holding period is the dependent variable.  The independent 
variables are the transaction costs measure, stock characteristics, the disposition effect proxy, and the PIN measure.  AdjIlliq 
is the average adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio over a year.  Size is the market capitalization.  Book-to-market is the book 
value from the previous fiscal year divided by the current market capitalization.  Momentum is the previous 12 month return.  
PIN is the annual average of probability of informed trading (Easley et al. 1997) variable.  Dummy variables (Dum) are 
created for the transaction costs measure, stock characteristics, and the PIN measure and set to one if a stock is in the highest 
quintile ranked according to one these variables.  For the transaction costs and the PIN measures, stocks are ranked and 
sorted  into  quintiles  at  the  beginning  of  the  month  of  a  purchase.    The  same  procedure  is  repeated  for  the  stock 
characteristics, but the ranking is done at the beginning of the month when there is a sale.  Disp Dum is the disposition proxy.  
It is a time-varying dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the stock at given day is trading above its purchase price.  
The investor characteristics are the household demographic and trade variables defined in Table 3.  Calendar month dummies 
(not reported) are twelve dummy variables that take on a value of one if the month of the transaction is equal to the month 
dummy.  Robust standard errors are calculated as in Lin and Wei (1989).  Ties are handled using the Efron procedure. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
   Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII  Model VIII  Model IX 
AdjIlliq Dum  0.587***                 0.660***  0.687***  0.695*** 
   <.0001                 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
Book-to-Market Dum     0.837***              0.913**       
      <.0001              <.0001       
Size  Sum        1.174***           1.146***       
         <.0001           <.0001       
Momentum Dum           1.438***        1.417***       
            <.0001        <.0001       
PIN Dum              1.182***        1.229***    
               <.0001        0.1015    
Disp Dum                 1.810***        1.793*** 
                  <.0001        <.0001 
AdjIlliq Dum * Disp Dum                          1.141*** 
                           <.0001 
Calendar month dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Investor Characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   41 
Table 6: Portfolio Liquidity and Holding Periods 
 
This table reports the results of regressions  using portfolio illiquidity  as the dependent  variable.  The 
independent  variables  are  investor  holding  periods  and  investor  characteristics.    PIlliq  is  the  average 
household portfolio illiquidity as defined in Section 4.3.  Holding period is the average household holding 
period.  It is calculated by averaging holding periods for all transactions of a given investor.  Positions that 
are not closed-out by the end of the sample period are treated as  censored observations.  A censored 
average is calculated assuming a Weibull distribution for the holding period. Investor characteristics are 
described  in  Table  3.    Robust  standard  errors  are  reported  below  coefficient  estimates.    Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
   Model I  Model II 
 Holding Period (years)  0.0515***  0.0631*** 
   0.0079  0.0152 
 Age     -0.0012*** 
      0.0002 
 Income     0.0002 
      0.0008 
 Married Dum     -0.0219 
      0.0007 
 Professional Dum     -0.0205*** 
      0.0069 
 Retired Dum     -0.0181** 
      0.0099 
 Male Dum     0.0591*** 
      0.0097 
 Foreign securities Dum     0.0487*** 
      0.0079 
 Mutual fund user Dum     0.001 
      0.0057 
 Option user Dum     0.0709*** 
      0.0096 
 Short user Dum     0.0122*** 
      0.0065 
 Log Total Equity     -0.0981*** 
      0.0024 
 Diversification     -0.0334*** 
      0.0113 
 N  63,024  19,746 
 Adj R
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Table 7: Holding Period Returns 
 
This table reports transaction returns to holding period groups.  Holding period is defined as the time period 
from the first purchase to the first sale of a security. Transactions are ranked and put into holding period 
quintiles.  1, 6, and 12 month returns are calculated starting from the date of purchase.  Holding period 
returns are average daily returns (reported in basis points) over the holding period.  Excess returns are 
returns net of characteristics matched portfolios, as in Daniel et al. (1997).  Amortized spread is the realized 
spread (as defined in Table 2) divided by the holding period.  Amortized commission is the round-trip 
commission divided by the holding period.  Transactions with a purchase or sale price less than $2, and 
holding periods less than 2 days, are excluded from the sample.  Panel B reports returns for a sub-sample of 
the households in the 1994-1996 time period.  The 1991-1993 time period is used to calculate a coefficient 
on  the  disp  variable  for  each  household  in  the  dataset.    Households  with  a  positive  disp  coefficient 
significant at the 10% level are removed from the sample.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Returns to Holding Period Groups 
   Low  2  3  4  High  High - Low 
1 Month Ret  0.045  0.036  0.011  0.004  0.001  -0.044*** 
1 Month Excess Ret  0.018  0.010  -0.006  -0.012  -0.013  -0.031*** 
6 Month Ret  0.079  0.112  0.132  0.054  0.008  -0.071*** 
6 Month Excess Ret  -0.009  0.011  0.025  -0.031  -0.055  -0.045*** 
12 Month Ret  0.148  0.187  0.200  0.188  0.056  -0.092*** 
12 Month Excess Ret  -0.014  0.007  0.012  -0.003  -0.081  -0.067*** 
Holding Period Ret (bps)  34.211  15.080  8.085  4.116  2.307  -31.904*** 
Holding Period Excess Ret (bps)  20.648  4.446  0.045  -2.778  -3.587  -24.235*** 
Holding Period Net Ret (bps)  0.386  3.280  2.603  1.358  1.137  0.751* 
Holding Period Net Excess Ret (bps)  -13.177  -7.354  -5.436  -5.537  -4.757  8.420*** 
Amortized Spread (bps)  5.257  3.063  1.501  0.721  0.264  -4.993*** 
Amortized Commission (bps)  28.568  8.737  3.981  2.037  0.906  -27.662*** 
Holding Period  10  36  87  192  543  533*** 
Panel B: Bias Adjusted Returns to Holding Period Groups 
   Low  2  3  4  High  High - Low 
1 Month Ret  0.016  0.027  0.020  0.010  0.002  -0.014*** 
1 Month Excess Ret  -0.002  0.006  0.001  -0.006  -0.009  -0.007*** 
6 Month Ret  0.049  0.078  0.109  0.119  0.051  0.002 
6 Month Excess Ret  -0.034  -0.013  0.007  0.011  -0.032  0.002 
12 Month Ret  0.112  0.153  0.201  0.232  0.187  0.075*** 
12 Month Excess Ret  -0.038  -0.014  0.004  0.013  -0.024  0.014*** 
Holding Period Ret (bps)  1.383  2.626  4.739  5.031  4.371  2.988 
Holding Period Excess Ret (bps)  -2.402  -4.392  -2.846  -2.547  -3.517  -1.115 
Holding Period Net Ret (bps)  -38.105  -12.659  -2.171  1.514  2.676  40.781*** 
Holding Period Net Excess Ret (bps)  -41.889  -19.677  -9.756  -6.065  -5.212  36.677*** 
Amortized Spread (bps)  5.588  3.844  1.819  0.886  0.377  -5.210*** 
Amortized Commission (bps)  33.900  11.441  5.091  2.631  1.318  -32.582*** 
Holding Period  7  24  59  125  309  302***   43 
Table 8: Household Transaction Costs Coefficient Estimates 
 
This  table  reports  summary  statistics  of  the  transaction  costs  coefficient,  which  is  calculated  from 
household level hazard regressions described in Section 5.2.  AdjIlliq variable is used as the transaction 
costs measure.  To get robust estimates, households are required to have made at least 50 trades during the 
sample period to be included in the analysis.  The summary statistics for the coefficients calculated with at 











































All Obs  Obs Significant at 
>10% 
Mean  -0.3002  -0.5834 
Median  -0.1089  -0.2752 
Std Dev  4.8435  7.5727 
Skew  -29.745  -20.165 
Kurtosis  1170.52  507.27 
P5  -1.1015  -1.5748 
P25  -0.3366  -0.5266 
P75  0.1188  0.3018 
P95  0.6860  1.2017   44 
Table 9: Transaction Costs and Holding Period Returns 
 
This table reports transaction returns to two  groups formed based on the sign of the  transaction costs 
coefficient, which is calculated from household level hazard regressions described in Section 5.2.  AdjIlliq 
variable is used as the transaction costs measure.  To get robust estimates, households are required to have 
made at least 50 trades during the sample period to be included in the analysis.  1, 6, and 12 month returns 
are calculated starting from the date of purchase.  Holding period returns are average daily returns (reported 
in basis points) calculated from the first purchase of a security to the first sale.  Excess returns are returns 
net of characteristics matched portfolios, as in Daniel et al. (1997).  Amortized spread is the realized spread 
(as defined in Table 2) divided by the holding period.  Amortized commission is the round-trip commission 
divided by the holding period.  Transactions with a purchase or sale price less than $2, and holding periods 
less than 2 days, are excluded from the sample.  Panel B reports returns for the full sample, and Panel A 
reports returns where the coefficient on the AdjIlliq variable is calculated with at least 10% significance.  
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Observations with AdjIlliq Coefficient at >10% Significance 
   Positive  Negative  Positive - Negative 
1 Month Ret  0.018  0.018  0.001 
1 Month Excess Ret  -0.001  -0.001  0.001 
6 Month Ret  0.079  0.066  0.013*** 
6 Month Excess Ret  -0.010  -0.020  0.01*** 
12 Month Ret  0.161  0.132  0.029*** 
12 Month Excess Ret  -0.010  -0.035  0.025*** 
Holding Period Ret (bps)  20.450  0.122  20.327*** 
Holding Period Excess Ret (bps)  10.756  -6.564  17.32*** 
Holding Period Net Ret (bps)  7.077  -10.950  18.027*** 
Holding Period Net Excess Ret (bps)  -2.617  -17.636  15.019*** 
Amortized Spread (bps)  0.675  2.202  -1.527*** 
Amortized Commission (bps)  12.697  8.870  3.827*** 
Holding Period  100  157  -57*** 
Panel B: All Observations 
   Positive  Negative  Positive - Negative 
1 Month Ret  0.018  0.017  0.001** 
1 Month Excess Ret  -0.001  -0.002  0.002** 
6 Month Ret  0.079  0.070  0.009*** 
6 Month Excess Ret  -0.010  -0.019  0.009*** 
12 Month Ret  0.162  0.146  0.016*** 
12 Month Excess Ret  -0.009  -0.027  0.018*** 
Holding Period Ret (bps)  16.909  4.125  12.785*** 
Holding Period Excess Ret (bps)  7.621  -3.542  11.163*** 
Holding Period Net Ret (bps)  4.228  -7.570  11.798*** 
Holding Period Net Excess Ret (bps)  -5.060  -15.236  10.176*** 
Amortized Spread (bps)  0.942  2.259  -1.317*** 
Amortized Commission (bps)  11.739  9.435  2.304*** 
Holding Period  116  147  -32*** 
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Table 10: Common Demand for Liquidity 
 
This table reports correlation statistics from three different simulations that test for a systematic component 
in the demand for liquid assets across households.  A pair of non-overlapping investor groups containing N 
investors (where N = 500, 1,000 and 5,000) is selected from the dataset.  The normalized difference in the 
liquidity ranks of stocks the investors in each group purchase and sell each month are calculated (IlliqBSI 
variable  in  Equation  10).    IlliqBSI  for  each  investor  group  is  regressed  on  the  market  factor  and  the 
aggregate buy-sell imbalance to remove the common variation in all household trades unrelated to liquidity.  
A time series correlation of the residual from the regression is calculated between two groups of investors.  
The same procedure is repeated 5,000 times.  The summary statistics for the 5,000 simulated correlations 






































# of Investors  Mean  Median  Std Dev  t-value 
500  0.1782  0.1559  0.3005  41.95 
         
1000  0.2108  0.2409  0.2790  53.43 
         
5000  0.3799  0.3826  0.1636  164.18   46 
Table 11: Illiquidity Rank of Transactions 
 
This table reports the differences in the adjusted illiquidity ranks of household purchases and sales of 
securities under different levels of aggregate market illiquidity.  Market illiquidity is calculated as the 
equal-weighted average of the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio of all stocks in a given month.  The sample 
period is broken into five equal time periods determined by the level of market illiquidity, ranked from 
„Low‟ to „High‟ in the table.  „MAX‟ is the month corresponding to the highest level of market illiquidity.  
Stocks are ranked each month based on the adjusted Amihud Illiquidity measure and assigned to percentile 
ranks.  The adjusted illiquidity rank of purchases and sales and the difference between purchases and sales 
are reported for five different levels of aggregate liquidity and for the month in which the market illiquidity 




Market Illiquidity  Buy/Sell  N Obs  Adj Illiquidity Rank  HH demeaned Adj 
Illiquidity Rank 
Low  Buy  188,601  16.71  0.94 
   Sell  155,111  16.05  0.24 
   Diff     0.66***  0.7*** 
              
2  Buy  226,817  15.87  0.29 
   Sell  185,471  15.86  -0.03 
   Diff     0.01  0.32*** 
              
3  Buy  186,929  16.00  0.43 
   Sell  155,989  15.44  -0.18 
   Diff     0.56***  0.61*** 
              
4  Buy  244,573  15.97  0.36 
   Sell  201,018  15.44  -0.31 
   Diff     0.53***  0.67*** 
              
High  Buy  215,823  16.35  0.58 
   Sell  174,064  17.21  0.99 
   Diff     -0.86***  -0.41*** 
              
MAX  Buy  11,436  14.94  -0.20 
   Sell  7,659  16.06  0.27 
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Table 12: Market Liquidity and Liquidity of Transactions 
 
This table reports the result of regressions using the illiquidity rank of the security that is purchased or sold 
as the dependent variable.  The independent variables are aggregate market illiquidity and investor income 
and  wealth.    Market  illiquidity  is  calculated  as  the  equal-weighted  average  of  the  adjusted  Amihud 
illiquidity ratio of all stocks in a given month.  MktIlliq is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if 
the aggregate market illiquidity is in the lowest month during the sample time period.  Buy is a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of one if the transaction is a purchase.  Affluent is a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of one if the investor is in the highest income bracket (>$100,000) and has invested more 
than $100,000 in the stock market during the sample period.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
   Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
MktIlliq  -0.8688 ***  0.0715  0.039  0.5357 
  0.1509  0.2380  0.2108  0.3710 
Buy    0.2892***  0.2961***  0.3174*** 
    0.0301  0.0267  0.0433 
Buy * MktIlliq    -1.5957***  -1.009***  -2.6296*** 
    0.3078  0.2710  0.4817 
Buy * MktIlliq * Affluent        2.1666*** 
        0.8313 
Affluent        -1.2371*** 
        0.0210 
Buy * Affluent        -0.7172 
        0.6384 
Affluent * MktIlliq        -0.2302*** 
        0.0782 
Adj R
2  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.08 
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Figure 1: Illiquidity Ratio 
 
This figure shows the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio for IBM and Crown Petroleum Corp from Jan. 1991 
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Figure 2: Holding Periods of Households 
 
This figure shows the median holding period for various investor and stock groups.  Age is the age of the 
investor.  Account type denotes whether the account is a retirement account.  Investment value is the 
average amount invested by the household in the stock market.  A stock is defined as illiquid if it belongs to 
the lowest liquidity decile of stocks ranked according to the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio. The holding 







































































 < 45         45 - 65        >65
Account Type
           Other   Retirement
Liquidity
       Other        Illiquid    
Investment Value
< 10K      10K-45K      >45K                     50 
Figure 3: Survival Probabilities 
 
This figure plots Kaplan-Meier survival probabilities for two groups of stocks held by households in the 
dataset.  Illiquid stocks in the figure are stocks that are in the highest illiquidity decile of stocks ranked 
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Figure 4: Hazard Ratios by Investor Sophistication 
 
This figure plots the hazard ratios on the AdjIlliq Dum variable for different groups of investors ranked by 
sophistication.  Hazard ratios are calculated by running a separate regression for each group of investors 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Holding Periods 
 
This figure plots the distribution of holding periods for the households in the dataset. Holding period is 
calculated as the average holding period for all the transactions of a given household.  Positions that are not 
closed-out by the end of the sample period are treated as censored observations.  A censored average is 
calculated assuming a Weibull distribution for the holding period.  The figure shows distribution of holding 
periods calculated using positions that are closed out by the end of the sample period („Closed‟ line), and 



































































Censored  53 
Figure 6: BSI and Illiquidity BSI 
 
This figure plots the difference in the illiquidity ranks of buys and sells (IlliqBSI), and the aggregate level 
of  market  illiquidity  (Mktilliq).    Market  illiquidity  is  calculated  as  the  equal-weighted  average  of  the 
adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio of all stocks in a given month.   
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